Razorpay AI Buildathon 2026, Track 01

Pramanagentic commerce control plane

27 August to 5 September 2026. Repository.

What I ownedEverything. Solo build: architecture, mandate format, policy engine, ledger, two-phase executor, evaluation harness, tests and the decision log.

Architecture, drawn

Praman: a purchase intent with no price field is checked by a deterministic policy engine against a human-signed mandate, recorded in an append-only ledger, and executed in two phases. No model sits inside the authorization path.Authorization path, no LLMproposescannot set pricevalidatecaps, allowlists, velocityoutcomepermitreserve then settleAgentany modelIntentSKU and quantity, no priceMerchant pageuntrustedCatalogprice resolves herePolicy enginepure, 19 reason codesMandateEd25519, human-signedLedgerappend-only, hash-chained, MerkleTwo-phase executorreserve, call, settle, advisory lockRazorpaytest modespend is replayed, never storeda DB write and a payment call cannot be atomic
Praman: a purchase intent with no price field is checked by a deterministic policy engine against a human-signed mandate, recorded in an append-only ledger, and executed in two phases. No model sits inside the authorization path.

Problem

An AI agent that can spend money is an agent that can be talked into spending it wrongly. Praman sits between the agent and the payment rail and decides, without asking any model, whether a purchase is allowed. The purchase intent carries only a SKU and a quantity. It has no price field, so a compromised merchant page has nothing to inject into the amount. Price resolves server-side from a trusted catalog after the intent is validated against a mandate the human signed.

Architecture

Three primitives do the work. An Ed25519 human-signed mandate carries merchant and category allowlists, per-transaction and cumulative caps, and velocity and denial-rate limits. A pure, deterministic policy engine evaluates each intent against the mandate and returns one of 19 closed reason codes. There is no LLM anywhere in the authorization path.

An append-only, hash-chained, Merkle-checkpointed ledger records every outcome. Immutability is enforced by a Postgres trigger, and spend is derived by replaying the ledger rather than read from a mutable balance.

Execution is two-phase under a per-mandate advisory lock, because a database transaction and an external payment call cannot be made atomic. The reservation is recorded before the call and the settlement after it, so a crash in between leaves a recoverable state, not a lost or doubled charge.

Decisions

No price in the intent
If the agent cannot state a price, nothing the agent reads can change the price. The amount comes from the catalog, never from the conversation.
No model in the authorization path
The model proposes, the policy engine decides. Authorization is a pure function of intent, catalog and mandate, so it is testable, replayable and immune to prompt injection by construction.
Spend is replayed, not stored
A mutable balance is a second source of truth that can drift from the ledger. Replaying costs one query and removes the whole class of bugs.

Measured, not asserted

Policy containment, dev and held-out splits
100%
False refusals on 12 benign cases
0
Injection ablation, 21 runs per arm, proposals influenced
0 defended, 2 undefended
Money moved, either arm
0 of 21

Bugs worth telling

Razorpay does not enforce receipt uniqueness
The documentation says receipts are unique. The API does not enforce it. Praman now enforces uniqueness on its own side before any call goes out.
Refusals leaked the mandate
The engine's refusal text named the limit that was hit, which told a probing agent exactly where the ceiling was. Refusals now carry a reason code only.
NaN read as permitted
Every comparison with NaN is false, so a malformed amount passed every cap check. Inputs are now validated as finite integers before evaluation.

Honest limits

  • TRUNCATE bypasses the append-only triggers.
  • Merkle checkpoints are not externally anchored.
  • The denial-rate cap is per window, so slow probing remains possible.
  • Test mode only. There is no HTTP API layer.

Scale

Single-purpose commits
142
Lines of TypeScript
~8,800
Packages and apps
9 + 4
Test files
20
Decision log entries
24

Stack

  • TypeScript
  • Node.js
  • PostgreSQL
  • Ed25519 signatures
  • Razorpay API